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Map source:  Alaska Division of Community Advocacy web site:  http://www.dced.state.ak.us/oed/map/map_new.htm. 
Alaska fish 
processing plants
Alaska Seafood Industry Economic Importance
Alaska’s seafood industry is world-scale.  The value of fish harvests 
was about $900 million in 2001.  About $1.3 billion in value was added 
in fish processing.  The seafood industry is particularly important for 
rural Alaska. Fishing is the most important source of income, taxes, 
infrastructure and utilities for coastal communities--and an important 
part of Alaska culture.  However, many fishermen and the majority of 
fish processing workers are non-residents, and most of the large 
companies in the seafood industry are based outside Alaska.
Average annual fishing 
employment is about 
9000 and average annual 
fish processing 
employment is about 
7000.  The number of 
people working in the 
seafood industry is much 
higher because many of 
the jobs are seasonal.







The Alaska salmon industry is 
diverse and complex.




Variety of fisheries and gear
Variety of products, processors, marketing organizations
Several different systems of monitoring, managing and 
regulating salmon fisheries in Alaska
And different sources of funding for research 
The five wild salmon species vary widely in 
size, fat content and other characteristics 















Alaska salmon are harvested in 27 different limited 
entry fisheries.
These fisheries differ widely in gear type, species harvested, 
volume harvested, values of harvest, number of permit holders, 
average earnings and average permit value—and in how well or 
























Bristol Bay Drift gill net 65.5 1,896 916 48% 96% 35.9 80.5
Southeast Purse seine 28.8 416 189 45% 86% 80.8 39.3
PWS Drift gill net 22.2 541 393 73% 97% 42.3 59.3
PWS Purse seine 19.2 268 197 74% 49% 147.8 22.0
Chignik Purse seine 12.3 99 75 76% 100% 124.4 200.0
Cook Inlet Drift gill net 4.2 577 384 67% 89% 8.3 32.3
Kuskokwim Gill net 1.2 823 815 99% 76% 1.9 6.5
Lower Yukon Gill net 0.7 704 694 99% 80% 1.3 12.1
Other 19 fisheries 91.5 6,432 5,193 81% 62% 23.0
Total 245.7 11,756 8,856 75% 73% 895.8 1103.1
Source:  Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Basic Information Tables.
Overview of Selected Alaska Salmon Fisheries, 2000






Department of Fish and Game
Boards of Fish and Game
The Alaska Constitution
(Article VIII-Natural Resources)
has four key provisions affecting fishery management.
SECTION 2. GENERAL AUTHORITY
SECTION 4. SUSTAINED YIELD
SECTION 3. COMMON USE
SECTION 15. NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF FISHERY 
ALASKA CONSTITUTION
SECTION 4. SUSTAINED YIELD.
Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other 
replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be 
utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield 
principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.
SECTION 15. NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF FISHERY.
No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or 
authorized in the natural waters of the State.
This section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any 
fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress 
among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to 
promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State.* 
*Note:  The second sentence was adopted by constitutional amendment in 
1972 to allow for limited entry management.
SECTION 3. COMMON USE.
Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are 
reserved to the people for common use. 
ALASKA CONSTITUTION
SECTION 2. GENERAL AUTHORITY
The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and 
conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land 
and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people. 












































Constitution & Laws Regulations
The Legislature has authority 
and responsibility for Alaska 
fisheries management.
The legislature has never 
defined the meaning of “for 
the maximum benefit of the 
people.”
There is no consensus about 
the goals of fishery 
management or the relative 
importance of different 




North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission
Pacific Salmon Commission
Yukon River Panel
Federal Subsistence Regional Advisory Council
North Pacific Fishery Management Council
Others
The Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game describes 
Alaska’s salmon 
management as 
“a story of success.”
Clearly Alaska has succeeded in achieving 
continued high salmon catches.
But salmon harvest values have 
fallen dramatically











































































Four years ago--in 2002--the Alaska salmon 
industry hit the low point of an economic crisis 
which had been building throughout the 1990s.
Between the 1980s and 2002, the value 
of Alaska’s salmon harvests fell by 62%.

















































Causes of the decline in value
Competition from farmed salmon
Many other factors:
Large Alaska harvests of pink and chum salmon 
(depressing prices)
Russian salmon entering world markets
Stagnation of Japanese economy
Declining demand for traditional product forms 
(canned salmon)
Increasing market power of large retail and food-
service operators
Between 1980 and 2004, Alaska’s share of world 
salmon supply fell from 42% to 15%.















































United States wild salmon supply is 
overwhelmingly from Alaska.
































































































The development of salmon farming has drastically transformed the world 
salmon industry over the past twenty-five years.  Between 1980 and 2004, 
wild salmon’s share of total world supply fell from 98% to 35%.
Norway and Chile dominate world farmed salmon 
supply, followed by the UK (Scotland) and Canada.



















































There are seven important commercial species of salmon and trout.
Three species are exclusively wild:  pink, chum, sockeye.
Two species are both wild and farmed: chinook and coho.









Wild pink and chum salmon are generally perceived as being “lower quality.” 
They command lower prices, and compete less directly with
farmed salmon. Wild coho, sockeye and chinook are generally 
considered “higher quality.”
They command higher prices, and compete more directly 










Pink 3.5 $0.11 $0.70
Chum 3.8 $0.21 $1.08
Coho 5.9 $0.69 $1.85
Sockeye 8.6 $0.62 $2.04
Chinook 10.4 $1.88 $2.73
Atlantic 10.9





U.S. Wholesale Prices, Selected Salmon Products, August 2006 ($/lb)
$0.00 $1.00 $2.00 $3.00 $4.00 $5.00 $6.00 $7.00
Frozen Chum, Pale, 4-6 lb.
Frozen Pink, 4-6 lb.
Fresh Pink, 2-4 lb.
Frozen Chum, Semi-Brite, 4-6 lb.
Frozen Chum, Brite, 4-6 lb.
Fresh Chum, 4-6 lb.
Fresh Atlantic, Whole, 10-12 lb.
Fresh Coho, 4-6 lb.
Fresh Sockeye, 4-6 lb.
Fresh Atlantic C-Trim Fillets, 3-4
lb.
Fresh Chinook, Gillnet, 7-11 lb.
Fresh Chinook, Troll, 7-11 lb.
Source:  Urner Barry's Seafood Price Current
During the summer of 2006, U.S. wholesale prices for pink and chum 
salmon were significantly less than farmed salmon, sockeye and coho
prices were similar, and chinook prices were higher.
Since 2002, the news coming out of Alaska 
salmon industry has been much more positive.


































The value of Alaska’s salmon harvests grew 
by 87% between 2002 and 2006.
Alaska wholesale and ex-vessel prices, 
2002-2005
Since 2002, wholesale and ex-vessel prices have 
increased for most products and species
The extent to which prices have increased varies by 
species
Prices for chinook and coho have increased 
dramatically
Prices for chum and pink have increased somewhat
Prices for sockeye have have increased only a little 
In general, Alaska ex-vessel prices for each species 
reflect:
Changes in wholesale prices
Changes in the share of different products produced
Despite the improvements since 2002, the value of 
Alaska salmon harvests remains well below levels 
of the 1980s.
























































How much of the increase in wild salmon prices was 
driven by:






























































Source:  Urner Barry Publications, Inc., Seafood Price Current.  Prices are low list prices for Chilean 2-3 lb fillets, FOB Miami; 6-8 lb 
Atlantics, FOB Northeast; 4-6 lb gillnet head-off fresh chum, FOB Seattle; 6-9 lb H&G frozen chum, FOB Seattle.
$/
lb
Fresh Atlantic, pinbone-out fillets Fresh Atlantic, whole fish
Fresh Chum Frozen Chum, semi-brite
Alaska salmon marketing?
NGO anti-farmed salmon campaigns?
High farmed salmon prices?
World supply of wild salmon is basically stable.
The United States (almost entirely Alaska) is the largest producer of 
wild salmon, followed by Japan, Russia and Canada.






























































Pink, sockeye and chum are all important 
components of U.S. wild supply.
Alaska wild salmon is about 15% of world supply.
Other wild salmon is about 21% of world supply.
Farmed salmon and trout is about 64% of world supply.



























Pink and chum salmon are the most largest components of total world 
wild salmon supply.   Sockeye, chinook and coho are a smaller share.































The world salmon market is complex.  There are many species, 
products and markets.  Supply and price trends differ between 
markets.
Markets have improved for Alaska salmon—but to varying degrees.
Prices are up significantly in the U.S. and EU fresh and frozen 
markets—especially for “higher quality” chinook, coho and sockeye.
It is unclear to what extent the market improvement is driven by:
“Positive” wild salmon marketing
“Negative” anti-farmed salmon publicity
Relative scarcity and high prices of farmed salmon
Two important traditional Alaska markets—the Japanese market and 
the canned salmon market—are not strengthening.
Alaska fishermen have been hurt not only by the 
decline in catch value but also by a drastic decline 
in the value of salmon limited entry permits.





































































Value estimated as number of permanent 
permits multiplied by average permit value as 
estimated by CFEC.  Source:  CFEC, Salmon 
Basic Information Tables, November 6, 2004.

















Source:  Neil Gilbertsen, “Residency and the Alaska Fisheries,” Alaska Economic Trends, 
December 2004.
The number of Alaskans fishing for salmon has declined by 40%.
“Aboard Bobby’s boat we were stunned and disgusted.  
At $.40/lb the bills ate up our meager earnings and 
then some. . .  Next June I think I’ll charter a plane and 
fly over to Bristol.  To save costs maybe I can entice 
some other Bay fishermen to share the charter. . . We’ll 
open the window and each of us in turn can throw his 
wallet into the murky water.  Then we’ll fly home, with 
a head start on everyone else to make up our losses.”
Source:  Mark Buckley, “Bristol Bay 2001:  Is this a recurring nightmare?,” 
Alaska Fisherman’s Journal, December 2001.
“People used to be proud to be a gill netter.  
People now ask you what you do, and you don’t 
want to tell them.  They ask you why 
you are an idiot.”
Source:  Interviews with Cook Inlet salmon fishermen conducted by the 
University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
2003.
Alaska’s salmon management 
system adds to costs and reduces 
value, compared with what would be 
possible if salmon fisheries were 
managed differently.
Fishing the Egegik North Line 
in Bristol Bay.  Clearly, the 
available fish could be caught 
by fewer boats with lower 
cost.  Intense competition 
also results in gear damage, 
and makes it difficult to 
handle fish carefully.
(Photograph by Bart Eaton.)
Two thirty-two foot 
Bristol Bay gillnetters. 
Although regulations 
limit boat length, over 
time more and more 
fishermen have built 
wider and taller boats 
in an effort to catch a 
larger share of the 
available fish.  Boat 
costs have increased 
without any 
corresponding 
increase in catches.  
(Photograph by Norm 
Van Vactor)
Bristol Bay fishermen picking fish from a drift gillnet.  It is difficult to 
handle fish carefully in the crowded space on board small boats while 
working to catch fish as fast as possible.  
(Photograph by Gunnar Knapp)
Fish delivered to a processor from a beach set net operation.  
It is difficult to maintain high quality for fish delivered in this way.
(Photograph by Gunnar Knapp)
But--despite:
years of drastic economic decline,
clear evidence that the management system
unnecessarily reduces value and adds to costs,
and recognition that management changes are 
needed
there have there been no significant changes
in the management of Alaska salmon fisheries,
(except for the Chignik fishery).
WHY?
The decline in the value of the salmon fishery has led to a 
continuing debate—for the past decade and a half—over how 
to address part of the challenges facing the industry.
From the beginning of this debate, part of the discussion has 
focused on the effects of salmon management regulations on 
costs and value, and the issue of “restructuring” the 
management of Alaska salmon fisheries. 
Numerous reports and forums have called for studying 
potential changes in Alaska salmon management.
“The Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission, DCED and DF&G, should 
develop fishery management and 
regulatory measures aimed at 
reducing operating costs . . . “
(Salmon Strategy Task Force, 1992)
“Reduce the cost of production.  An 
overcapitalized harvesting fleet [contributes] to 
increased production costs.  Permit buy back 
programs financed by the state or by fishermen 
should be investigated.”
(Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Scenario 
Planning:  Developing a Strategy for the Future of the Alaska Salmon 
Industry, 1993)
“Review and modify existing regulations which 
constrain the achievement of maximum intrinsic 
value of our many fishery resources. . . . Lower 
operational and capital costs by fishery and gear 
groups.  Remove gear requirements that reduce
efficiencies. . .”
(Strategic Solutions Consulting Group,  Proceedings of the Alaska Salmon Strategy 
Forum, 1997).
“Initiate a review of . . . the combined effect of 
the different state policies which affect the 
salmon industry, including . . . constitutional 
standards, the limited entry system, . . . fisheries 
management and allocation, vessel and gear 
regulations. . .
(Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Salmon 
Forum II Report, 1998.)
“The Alaska Fish Summit endorsed 
creation of regional task force sub-groups 
to work on fleet reduction and
fleet-behavior strategies. . .” 
(Information Insights, Report on 2002 Alaska Fish Summit.)




Gunnar Knapp and Fran Ulmer
Institute of Social and Economic Research
University of Alaska Anchorage
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage, Alaska 99508
THE QUESTION WE WISHED TO ANSWER:
Why—
despite years of drastic economic decline
and
despite clear evidence that the management system
unnecessarily reduces value and adds to costs
have there been no significant changes
in the management of Alaska salmon fisheries?
Inherent challenges make restructuring 
an inherently difficult task.
Diversity of Alaska salmon fisheries
Different fisheries have different problems
Any changes will affect different fisheries in different 
ways
Complexity of the issues and options
Causes of decline in value
Effects of strategies other than restructuring
Effects of different approaches to restructuring
Heterogeneity of participants






















































Constitution & Laws Regulations
Institutional challenges in restructuring 
Alaska salmon fisheries
The legislature has not undertaken restructuring itself
The legislature has not designated clear responsibility, 
authority and capacity to any other agency
The Alaska constitution severely limits options for 
Alaska fishery management—but the extent of these 
limits is uncertain and can’t be known until it is tested.
The legislature has not undertaken 
restructuring itself
Most legislators don’t understand fisheries issues
Most legislators are reluctant to get involved in controversial 
fisheries issues
Legislators are facing many other complex issues
The legislature has not designated 
clear responsibility, authority and 
capacity to any other agency
The authority of the Board of Fisheries to undertake 
restructuring is limited and uncertain
The Board of Fisheries has very limited funding.  They 
have almost no staff or analytical capacity to study 
complex restructuring issues
The Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission administers 
the limited entry law—but does not have authority to 
change the law
Other agencies have even less responsibility or authority 
for restructuring
The Alaska constitution severely limits 
options for Alaska fishery 
management—but the extent of these 
limits is uncertain and can’t be known 
until it is tested.
Fish are “reserved to the people for common use”
“No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery”—except for limited 
entry “to relieve economic distress.”
ANY restructuring that reduces the number of participants or 
creates new “special privileges” might potentially be unconstitutional
Whether changes would be constitutional can’t be known until the
Alaska Supreme Court has ruled on them
It takes a long time for the Supreme Court to rule
Any change to fisheries management is risky 
A 1998 study by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission which 
briefly reviewed restructuring options pointed out that:
“. . Under our state constitution, a limited fishery can become too 
exclusive, requiring the state to add more permits back into the fishery 
to make the limited fishery constitutional.  In other words, money 
could be invested in a buy out program, but a court could, 
subsequently, require permits to be added back into the fishery. This 
is a risk for those who would pay for a buy out program. The degree 
of risk must be assessed on a fishery-by-fishery basis.” 
This constitutional risk—and the difficulty of getting clear answers 
about just how risky different kinds of changes might be—serves to 
discourage individuals in both industry and government from investing 
significant effort to achieve restructuring.
It is very unclear how any group can or should work 
to bring about significant management changes.
Source:  Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Outline of Options for Fleet 
Consolidation in Alaska’s Salmon Fisheries (1998).  
“Discuss proposed legislation with the Entry Commission, 
Department of Fish and Game, members of the Board of 
Fisheries, the Attorney General, legislative attorneys and 
Legislators. Any legislative proposal would require serious 
work by interested private individuals.”
Fractional entry 
permits
“A change of state law would be required. Discuss proposed 
legislation with Entry Commission, Department of Fish and 
Game, members of the Board of Fisheries, the Attorney 
General, legislative attorneys and legislators. Any legislative 
proposal would require serious work by interested private 
individuals. Constitutional risks . . . would be present in 
such a program. A careful examination of the risks on a 
fishery-by-fishery basis, and, ultimately, an optimum 







How to Undertake Selected Restructuring Options, as 
Described in a 1988 CFEC Report
There is institutional gridlock 
in the
management of Alaska 
salmon fisheries.
WHAT ECONOMISTS HAVE BEEN SAYING:
For a biologically and economically healthy fishery,
you need good fishery management. 
THE ALASKA SALMON EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS:
For good fishery management,
you need good political institutions in charge of fishery 
management.
Ability to define goals of fisheries management 
Clearly defined responsibility, authority and capacity for 
achieving goals of fisheries management
Clearly defined responsibility, authority and capacity to make 
changes in fisheries management in response to changing 
circumstances
Why has Alaska succeeded in sustained 
yield management of its salmon 
fisheries?
Goal of sustained yield is clearly established in the constitution
Legislature has delegated clear responsibility and authority to the 
Board of Fisheries to establish regulations “for the purposes of
conservation and development” of Alaska fisheries resources
Legislature has provided the Board of Fisheries and the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game with the capacity--adequate 
funding—to conserve the resource
(Alaska has been lucky with favorable ocean conditions.)
What are the lessons from the earlier 
restructuring of Alaska salmon 
fisheries—the establishment of limited 
entry in the 1970s?
There were strong economic incentives for limited entry due to very 
low runs and increasing participation
Initial attempts at limiting entry were found unconstitutional
In 1971-72 the Governor proposed, the legislature passed, and 
voters adopted a constitutional amendment to allow limited entry
“to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those 
dependent upon them for a livelihood.”
A study group on Limited Entry was appointed which prepared a 
345 page report in February 1973.
The legislature adopted statutes based on Study Group’s 
recommendations
The law was challenged and successfully defended in subsequent 
years












































Constitution & Laws Regulations
In the early 1970s 
the Alaska legislature 
passed the Limited 
Entry act which 
established limited 
entry in Alaska 






What was different in the adoption 
of Limited Entry?
The governor and legislature were directly involved as 
leaders of the process
The governor and legislature were willing to think 
broadly and consider far-reaching changes in fisheries 
management—including amending the constitution
The governor and legislature recognized the complexity 
of the issues and the need for expert research and 
analysis.
Why were governor and legislature more 
willing to engage the complex issues 
associated with limited entry than they 
are to engage restructuring now?
Alaska was different
Many legislative leaders were fishermen
Today most legislators are from urban areas and don’t 
know or care much about fisheries issues
Legislators are concerned with other complex and 
pressing issues
The Chignik Co-op
The Chignik co-op appeared to represent an example of a successful 
restructuring of an Alaska salmon fishery.
The Board of Fisheries authorized a separate allocation to Chignik
permit holders who chose to fish cooperatively
Most of the 100 permit holders joined the co-op
The co-op used 20 boats where 70+ boats would otherwise have 
fished—dramatically reducing costs
The co-op developed new products and markets—including live 
delivery of fish
The co-op was vehemently opposed by a minority of permit holders 
who chose not to join the co-op and instead to fish independently
What are the lessons 
of the Chignik Co-op?
Compared with many other Alaska fisheries, the Chignik fishery 
has a relatively small and homogenous group of permit holders
The proponents of the co-op engaged in a sophisticated and 
extensive lobbying effort to get the Board of Fisheries to 
approve a co-op.
The board acted without careful analysis of the implications of 
the co-op
A central issue in the debate was whether the Board had the 
authority to authorize a co-op
Opponents of the co-op challenged the co-op in court.  
An Alaska superior court upheld the co-op—but in 2005 the 
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the co-op was inconsistent 
with the limited entry law.
OUR CONCLUSION PRIOR TO THE COURT’S RULING (November 2004)
“If the Supreme Court upholds the decision of the Superior Court, it 
will have the effect of extending the extent to which the board has 
clear authority to restructure fisheries for economic purposes.”
A REVISED CONCLUSION (May 2005)
The Supreme Court’s decision has the effect of further limiting the 
extent to which the board has clear authority to restructure fisheries 
for economic purposes.
What are the lessons from 
restructuring of federally managed 
Alaska fisheries?
The halibut, pollock, and crab fisheries have been 
significantly restructured.
In the Alaska federal management process, there exists
Ability to define goals of fisheries management 
Clearly defined responsibility, authority and capacity 
for achieving goals of fisheries management
Clearly defined responsibility, authority and capacity 
to make changes in fisheries management in 
response to changing circumstances
Examining the differences
What are the political, legal, structural, practical 
differences between state and federal realms?
What difference does the salmon life cycle make? Or the 
distribution of salmon?
What difference does history make?
What differences do community, economic, cultural
realities make?
Thanks to Gunnar Knapp for slides 
of graphs and photographs
For more information visit:
www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu
